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The Anglo-American nuclear relationship has undergone a process of evolution 
full of twists and turns. Its origins can be traced back as early as to the first years 
of the Second World War. Its inherent feature has been the continuous changes in 
the character of this unique and troubled partnership. In order to understand the 
most serious crisis in the special relationship that occurred in 1962 in the atomic 
field - its most important component - one must know about the history of nu­
clear relations between the two countries. Although there had been many dis­
agreements and rifts between the two allies since as early as 1940, they had never 
endangered the special partnership as seriously as in the early 1960s. The origins 
of this crisis were disagreements and misunderstandings not merely over technol­
ogy but also over nuclear strategy. Nevertheless, what had begun primarily as a 
technical problem soon developed into the gravest political crisis in the relations 
between the two countries. Thus, the Skybolt affair serves as a good example of a 
reciprocal relationship between broadly understood technology and its implica­
tions on the one hand, and politics, and especially international relations, on the 
other. Despite numerous difficulties in nuclear relations, none of them before the 
Skybolt saga had caused such a serious threat to bilateral relations. After the Suez 
adventure of 1956, it was the most troubled period in Anglo-American relations. 
The allies seemed to be moving in completely different directions. Fortunately, the 
crisis was overcome. Paradoxically, the two gravest debacles in the special part­
nership - Suez and Skybolt - were followed by the restoration of closer diplomatic 
and military relations. 
This paper aims to analyze the Skybolt crisis and its impact on the so-called spe­
cial relationship. After some introductory remarks on the concept of the 
“specialness” a brief historical outline of the Anglo-American nuclear co-operation 
follows. The purpose of this presentation is to help to locate the Skybolt crisis in a 
wider background. We shall see that it did not happen suddenly and that it was not 
the first disagreement over nuclear issues. After highlighting the previous difficulties 
and the ways they were overcome, it should be easier to relate to them the crisis 
under examination. Moreover, it will help us to answer the questions of what was 
unique about the Skybolt affair and what were its longer-term consequences. The 
positions of both Britain and the United States will be presented. The final part, 
which serves as the conclusion, will relate the whole crisis in the nuclear field to the 




The concept of the Anglo-American "special relationship” is an ambiguous one. The 
wider foundation on which this notion rests is that of cultural unity manifested by a 
common language (which has allowed for extensive and intensive communication), 
law and the liberal tradition of political thought. 1 On these grounds an intimate po­
litical and military partnership has emerged and developed. The special partnership 
is not composed of one relationship but of many. Moreover, it operates at many 
different levels and in many areas. Thus, we can distinguish its four basic compo­
nents: the consultative relations between the two bureaucracies (diplomatic consul­
tations), intelligence co-operation, collaboration between the two navies, and nu­
clear co-operation. 2 The evolution of intelligence collaboration was rather smooth 
when compared to nuclear relationship. 
1 “(... ) Wilsonianism can legitimately be seen as British Liberalism transfonned by Ameri­
ca’s crusading-sense of mission and energized by America’s enonnous new power. ” 
D. Reynolds, Rethinking Anglo-American relations, “International Affairs, " vol. 65, no. 1, 
1988/89, p. 102. 
2 Ibidem, p. 98. 
3 G. M. Dillon, Dependence and Deterrence: success and civility in the Anglo-American spe­
cial nuclear relationship, 1962-1982, Gower, London 1982, pp. 6-7. 
4 Ibidem, p. 7. 
5 A. Danchev, On specialness, “International Affairs, " vol. 72, no. 4, 1996, pp. 738-740. 
6 D. Reynolds, A "special relationship'? America, Britain and the international order since 
the Second World War, “International Affairs, ” vol. 62, no. 1, 1985/86, p. 2. 
Generally speaking, there are two basic approaches towards the concept of the 
special relationship. 3 4The first puts emphasis on the common interests shared by the 
US and Britain. According to the second, it is sentiment (language, history, culture 
and politics) that makes for the distinctiveness of the relations. Yet neither explana­
tion alone offers a convincing account of the phenomenon. The following statement 
expresses this duality: “The Anglo-American relationship has been a sentimental 
attachment as much as a business transaction precisely because of the interests in­
volved, and the passion with which they have been held and pursued. ”'1
It should be remembered that the term “special relationship" is the British con­
struct. 5 It originated during the Second World War and was then popularized by 
Winston Churchill. The Grand Alliance was the period of the greatest, and thereby 
formative, extent of the relationship. The major reason for creating the military alli­
ance was the threat perception - in the first instance from Germany, and thereafter 
from the Soviet Union. 
The whole notion is ambiguous since there has been a “love-hate” relationship 
between the two countries. Since its initial stages, co-operation was parallel to compe­
tition, and friendship to rivalry. When British power was declining, the American 
power was emerging. The Pax Britannica was being transformed into the Pax Ameri­
cana. Britain was declining into a regional power while the United States was rising as 
a superpower. In this context “the notion of an Anglo-American special relationship 
has been a device used by a declining power for trying to harness a rising power to 
serve its own needs. ”6 Because of the disparity in power exercised by both countries, 
the partnership has been unavoidably unequal with Britain being a junior partner. 
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After the loss of Empire and first-class power status Great Britain was searching 
for a new role in the world. British leaders decided to opt for the conscious course 
of becoming more dependent on the United States. That aim turned out to be one 
of the main goals of British foreign policy. After the war, it was based on Chur­
chill’s three concentric circles theory, according to which there are three spheres 
of British interests: the United States, Western Europe and the Commonwealth. In 
different periods of history the relevance of each of these spheres varied. After 
1945 the circle labeled “the United States” became central for British foreign policy 
since “for Britain, the alliance has been of importance in helping to sustain her 
world position as her relative power has declined.”7 In 1949 William Strang’s 
Committee outlined the basis of British foreign policy assuming that “The interests 
of the United Kingdom therefore demand that her present policy of close Anglo- 
-American cooperation in world affairs should continue. Such cooperation will 
involve our sustained political, military and economic effort.”8 Thus, the principle 
of the Anglo-American special relationship turned into the cornerstone of British 
post-war foreign policy. The course of interdependence was thought to be one of 
the best ways of extending British influence. The formula which had been worked 
out was of the strengthening the special relationship. Its most important aspect 
was the co-operation in the field of atomic energy, that is to say, the special nu­
clear relationship.
7 J. Baylis, The Anglo-American Relationship and Alliance Theory, “International Rela­
tions,” vol. VIII, issue 4, November 1985, p. 373.
8 Quoted in: R. Ovendale, Anglo-American Relations in the Tuentieth Century, Macmil­
lan, London 1998, p. 83.
9 D. Reynolds, op.cit., p. 4.
10 A.P. Brody: “(...) after the spread of nuclear weapons within an alliance, cohesion will 
decline/’ H. Kissinger: “Nuclear weapons make alliances less likely to (...) persist because 
allies are not necessary to gain preponderant power.” Quoted in: J. Baylis, The Anglo- 
-American..., pp. 373-374.
The concept of a special relationship, however, is not uniquely Anglo-American. 
It has also been applied to the US’s relations with, for example, Israel, Brazil and the 
Federal Republic of Germany.9 Nevertheless, the relations between the US and the 
UK have been exceptional in quality when compared to other bilateral alliances. It is 
extremely difficult to find closer relations between any two countries in the nuclear 
field than in the case of the US and the UK. P.A. Brody and Henry Kissinger claimed 
that the occurrence of nuclear weapons within an alliance would inevitably lead to 
its disintegration and, eventually, to its break-up. However, at least with reference to 
the Anglo-American military alliance, this, as we shall see, did not come true.10 De­
spite more than one crisis over nuclear issues in the history of the special relation­
ship, nuclear weapons in general contributed to the cohesion of the alliance. Nu­
clear co-operation has been very much at the heart of the special relationship. The 
collaboration in this field seemed to have a spillover effect in other areas of the 
relations between the two countries. Thus, using the basic assumption of the neo­
functionalist theory of integration it can be claimed that nuclear collaboration, being 
the chief area of the special relationship, worked as a catalyst for co-operation in the 
other fields. This will be evident once the impact of the Skybolt crisis on the part­
nership is examined. Paradoxically, this severe crisis, after being overcome, led to 
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closer collaboration. At the same time, it resulted in both qualitative and quantitative 
changes of the character of the special relationship. The shift from partnership to 
dependence might be observed.
The special relationship does not mean full harmony. On the contrary, there have 
often been periods of friction and disenchantment. Thus, both continuity and 
change (even given the most dramatic crises) are inherent features of Anglo-Ame­
rican relations. This article aims to examine one of these periods of friction.
THE UK-US NUCLEAR CO-OPERATION IN A HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE
In the period of 1939-1941 nuclear research was much more advanced in the United 
Kingdom than in the United States. Two key reasons of this may be identified. These 
were scientific-technical and political factors. The former was the contribution of the 
Jewish scientists, who had emigrated from Nazi Germany, while the latter was Prime 
Minister Churchill’s personal interest in the work on an atomic bomb.
In March 1940 two émigré physics, Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls, prepared a 
memorandum. Their essential belief was that it would be possible to construct an 
uranium bomb. As a direct result of the memorandum, in June 1940, a special gov­
ernmental body - the MAUD Committee - was set up in order to examine their the­
sis.11 Since its prime goal was to find the answer to the question weather it would be 
possible to construct a bomb, the MAUD report had vital consequences. In general, 
the Frisch-Peierls thesis was confirmed.
11 The name of the Committee came from the last words of Niels Bohr’s telegram to Otto 
Frish of April 1940: “Tell Cockcroft and Maud Ray Kent.” British intelligence took the last three 
words as an anagram. After replacing the letter “y” with “i” in the word “Ray” and using the 
other two words “Maud” and “Kent” a new phrase was created: “radium taken.” The conclu­
sion seemed to be obvious - Bohr warned that the Germans had advanced their atomic pro­
gram. Later, it became clear that the message was addressed to the former governess of Bohr’s 
children, Maud Ray living at that time in Kent. Subsequently MAUD was commonly taken as 
meaning Military Applications of Uranium Detonation or Ministry of Air: Uranium Deve­
lopment. P. Malone, The British Nuclear Deterrent, Croom Helm, London 1984, passim 1, p. 
22; M. Bundy, Danger and Survival. Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years, Random 
House, New York 1988, pp. 25-26.
12 Quoted in: P. Malone, op.cit., p. 1.
The Prime Minister’s attitude was best expressed in the following words: 
“Although personally I am quite content with the existing explosives, I feel we must 
not stand in the path of improvement...).”12 In September 1940, during his meeting 
with the Chiefs of Staff, the decision was reached that “immediate action with the 
maximum priority" should be taken. The British nuclear program was officially inau­
gurated.
By the way of contrast, in the United States, research was concentrated on an 
atom as the source of energy. The turning point, which resulted in starting up the 
American nuclear program, was when, in October 1941, the MAUD report was offi­
cially passed on to the US. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt then inaugurated a 
large atomic project. Having known the early history of nuclear weapons, we can 
wholeheartedly subscribe to the opinion expressed by Margaret Gowing that 
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“Without it [the MAUD report] World War II would almost certainly have ended be­
fore an atomic bomb was dropped.”13 14
13 M. Cowing, Nuclear Weapons and the “Special Relationship" [in:] The “Special Relation­
ship", Anglo-American Relations Since 1945, W.M. Roger Louis, H. Bull (eds.), Clarendon 
Press, Oxford 1986, p. 119.
14 R.G. Hewlett, E. Anderson, Jr., The New World, 1939/1946. A History of the United States 
Atomic Energy Commission, vol. I, The Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania 
1962, pp. 260-261.
15 R.W. Clark, The Birth of the Bomb. The Untold Story of Britain’s Part in the Weapon That 
Changed the World, Phoenix House Ltd, London 1961, pp. 183, 184.
16 J. Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations, 1939-80. The Special Relationship, Mac­
millan, London 1984, pp. 23-24.
17 M. Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy 1939-1945, Macmillan, London 1964, p. 447.
18 M. Sherwin, A World Destroyed. The Atomic Bomb and the Grande Alliance, Vintage 
Books, New York 1977, p. 113-
19 Quoted in: ibidem, p. 114.
Britain, being more advanced in nuclear research, was reluctant to agree to 
American proposals to merge the atomic projects. The British believed that it would 
never be too late for closer co-operation. That was, however, a most serious miscal­
culation. The United States quickly developed its program which was significantly 
accelerated after Pear Harbor. The roles were being reversed and Britain was now 
lagging behind. At the time, it was Britain that was proposing the merging of the 
two programs but, not surprisingly, the US, with its Manhattan Project already estab­
lished and developing under the Army’s control, was not now interested in such 
integration.
The first Anglo-American agreement in the field of nuclear co-operation was signed 
between Roosevelt and Churchill in Hyde Park in June 1942.H It was decided that, 
given the threat of German bombardment of the British Isles, the entire British pro­
gram would be moved to the US. The Hyde Park Agreement introduced full collabo­
ration which was to be based on the principle of “sharing the results as equal part­
ners.”15 Nonetheless, by the end of 1942 the Americans had halted the flow of infor­
mation which they justified as necessary safeguarding the security of the Manhattan 
Project. This American policy of “restricted interchange,” formally approved by Roose­
velt in December 1942, caused the first crisis in Anglo-American nuclear relations. A 
British diplomatic offensive aiming to fully implement the Hyde Park Agreement was 
launched. As a result, in September 1943, the Quebec Agreement was signed which 
formalized the wartime regime of nuclear co-operation.16 The decisions taken in Que­
bec were extended over the post-war period by the Hyde Park aide-mémoire of Sep­
tember 1944.17 Full Anglo-American collaboration appeared to be secured. At that time 
the US seemed to acknowledge that “armed with atomic weapons, Great Britain would 
be America’s outpost on the European frontierf...)."18 The spirit of the special relation­
ship was evident in the statement by Roosevelt’s adviser, Harry Hopkins: “It was vital 
for the United States to have a strong Britain because we must be realistic enough to 
understand that in any future war England would be on America’s side and America 
on England’s. It was no use having a weak ally.”19
Very soon, however, after the end of the war, it became clear that the United 
States was no longer interested in any nuclear collaboration. In general, such co­
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operation was regarded as a serious burden for US policy. The dominating approach 
was one of nuclear monopoly. Any commitments to another country were consid­
ered as a vast obstacle. This American policy was profoundly ambiguous. On the 
one hand, the US was pursuing the project of international control of atomic energy 
(the Baruch Plan), but at the same time it wanted to secure its own nuclear hegem­
ony. None of these tactics was favorable for Britain since both nationalism and mul­
tinationalism excluded bilateralism. Eventually, the monopolist position won. In 
September 1946, Congress passed the McMahon Act introducing a national nuclear 
regime.20 Any exchange of atomic (“restricted”) information with other countries was 
prohibited. It was the final blow for the British efforts to continue the wartime col­
laboration. After then, the United States and Britain were to proceed with their nu­
clear programs separately.
20 R.G. Hewlett, E. Anderson, op.cit., pp. 714-722.
21 M. Gowing, L. Arnold, Independence and Deterrence. Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945- 
-1952, Macmillan, London 1974; B. Cathcart, Test of Greatness. Britain's Struggle for the Atom 
Bomb, John Murray, London 1994.
22 J. Baylis, American bases in Britain: tbe "Truman-Attlee Understandings, ” “The World 
Today," vol. 42, no. 8, 9, January-December 1986, pp. 155-159.
23 C.C. Kingseed, Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956, Louisiana State University Press, 
Baton Rouge-London 1995, p. 81.
In 1947 the Attlee cabinet decided to begin a national (“go-it-alone”) nuclear 
project. This resulted in the explosion of the UK’s first atomic bomb in October 
1952.21 The United Kingdom joined the “nuclear club” becoming the third nuclear 
power. Nuclear capabilities strengthened Britain’s world position, seriously under­
mined during the Second World War and by the dissolution of the Empire. It was 
also an important factor in reinforcing Britain’s role in NATO. Consequently, the 
country reinforced its position vis-a-vis the United States.
From the late 1940s onwards it looked as if Anglo-American relations were im­
proving. In 1948, in connection with the Berlin blockade, the US asked the British 
for the establishing of American bases in Britain. The response was positive and 
sixty bombers B-29 arrived.22 From the early 1950s Britain was de facto hosting 
American nuclear strategic strike bases. The legal foundation for the American pres­
ence was agreed in October 1951 in the Truman-Attlee Understandings. This docu­
ment became the basic regulation of the issue during the Cold War and thereafter. 
The presence of American forces in Britain inaugurated the strategic relations be­
tween the two countries since limited but mutual strategic planning, targeting and 
co-operation between British and American air forces were required.
Although the partnership had improved and was gradually developing, in 1956 
came the most dramatic crisis of the time. It was over Suez. President Eisenhower 
strongly opposed the use of force and under his influence the Anglo-French military 
action was stopped. The President described the operation as “the greatest mistake of 
our times," adding: “Bombs, by God. What does Anthony think he’s doing? Why is he 
doing this to me?"23 Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, Anthony Eden’s successor, real­
ized that the traditional concept of the three concentric circles, on which British post­
war foreign policy was based, had to be fundamentally reassessed. It was clear that 
any independent British action without American support would be risky and destined 
to fail. One of the basic principles of Macmillan’s foreign policy turned out to be the 
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notion of interdependence with the United States. For the Anglo-American nuclear 
relations the Suez crisis had paradoxical consequences; it speeded up the restoration 
of the close co-operation broken off in 1946. “Suez should have been the end of the 
U.S.-British tie; in fact, it was the amphitheater of its rebirth.”21 *4
21 R. Dawson, R. Rosecrance, Theory and Reality in the Anglo-American Alliance, “World
Politics," vol. 19, issue 1, October 1966, p. 51.
25 J. Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, STYX Publications, Groningen 1993.
26 R.A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge. Eisenhower’s Response to the Soviet Satellite, Oxford
University Press, Oxford 1993; D. Healey, The Sputnik and Western Defence, “International
Affairs,” vol. 34, no. 2, April 1958, pp. 145-156.
27 The reductions were to be from 690,000 to 375,000. At the same time conscription was 
to be replaced by professional army. Defence: Outline of Future Policy, Cmnd. 124, HMSO, 
London 1957.
28 In: J. Baylis, Anglo-American..., pp. 108-111.
29 J. Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State. The US, Britain and the Military Atom, Mac­
millan, London 1983, p. 125.
NUCLEAR CO-OPERATION RESTORED
A few factors that contributed to the re-establishment of the unique nuclear partner­
ship can be enumerated. The launching of Sputnik and subsequent changes in 
American nuclear strategy, the demonstration of British thermonuclear capacity, and, 
on the whole, the tightening of ties after the Suez crisis should be regarded as the 
most essential.25
The launching of Sputnik in October 1957 by the Soviet Union brought about 
real shock, if not panic in the United States. American technological domination in 
nuclear weaponry had been challenged and the strategy of massive retaliation ques­
tioned.26 In order to bridge the “missile gap” that had arisen the US introduced the 
doctrine of the limited nuclear war. Its essence was to supply the NATO allies with 
tactical nuclear weapons until the US would come into the possession of interconti­
nental ballistic capabilities. Thus, Western Europe would be covered with a sort of 
nuclear umbrella. At the same time, however, the US's allies should improve their 
conventional forces. In those circumstances, the United States badly needed its allies. 
Among them Britain, as the third nuclear power and an American overseas base, 
was in the best position. When, however, the Americans were introducing their new 
strategy, Britain’s announcements of reductions in its conventional forces were 
deeply against American aims. Significant cuts were proclaimed in the British De­
fense Minister, Duncan Sandy’s White Paper of April 1957.27 28The Americans thought 
that supplying nuclear information and weapons to Britain would allow the British 
to do more on the conventional front.
In March 1957, during the Bermuda Eisenhower-Macmillan meeting a tentative 
agreement on the Thor intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRMBs) to be stationed 
on the British soil was reached. The final arrangement was signed in February 
1958.2H The formula of control over the weapons was a dual-key system. It meant 
that the missiles could not be launched without the mutual consent of both the 
United States and Britain.29 This rule significantly strengthened the principle of inter­
dependence for which Macmillan was striving hard. The effects of the agreement 
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may be examined from two angles. Militarily, the US achieved the possibility of 
reaching the territory of the Soviet Union with its nuclear weapons. Thus, it secured 
itself credible deterrence capabilities. The American nuclear umbrella over Western 
Europe had been strengthened and the concept of “nuclear sharing" within NATO 
had acquired a practical realization.30 On the other hand, Thor would secure ballistic 
missile capabilities for the United Kingdom until the development of the British 
ground-to-air missile, Blue Streak, would be completed. According to plans, it was to 
enter service in 1965/66. Politically, the agreement constituted a crucial stage in the 
process of the restoration of close Anglo-American relations after the Suez affair 
since military collaboration was intensified.
30 Apart from Britain, the American IRBMs were also located in Italy and Turkey. J. Melis- 
sen, Nuclearizing NATO, 1957-1959: the “Anglo-Saxons, " nuclear sharing and the fourth 
country problem, “Review of International Studies," vol. 20, issue 3, 1994, pp. 253-276.
31 See: K. Pyne, Art or Article'!' The need for and Nature of the British Hydrogen Bomb, 
1954-58, “Contemporary Record,” vol. 9, no. 3, 1995, pp. 562-585; J. Baylis, The Development 
of Britain's Thermonuclear Capability 1954-61: Myth or Reality?, “Contemporary Record,” vol. 
8, no. 1, 1994, pp. 159-174.
32 D.D. Eisenhower, The White House Years, Vol. II, Waging Peace, 1956-61, Heinemann, 
London 1966, p. 219.
33 J. Simpson, op.cit., p. 137.
The UK not only considerably strengthened its international prestige but, first and 
foremost, its negotiating position vis-à-vis the US by conducting the successful test 
explosion of its thermonuclear device in May 1957.31 The Americans were genuinely 
impressed by British scientific-technical potential. President Eisenhower was a strong 
supporter of the idea of the restoration of nuclear collaboration. He expressed his 
position as follows: “when many of our former secrets were known to our enemies, 
it made no sense to keep them from our friends.”32 British thermonuclear capabilities 
were something that Eisenhower was badly in need of to break down the opposition 
in Congress and the Joint Atomic Energy Commission for the amending of the 
McMahon Act in order to allow the re-establishment of relations with Britain.
British nuclear policy after 1945 proceeded in a double-track way. On the one 
side, Britain was developing its own atomic and thereafter thermonuclear pro­
grams. On the other, diplomatic actions as well as less formal activities were un­
dertaken in order to restore the co-operation with the United States. In both of 
these spheres the UK had succeeded. Atomic and hydrogen bombs were produced 
and the Americans were influenced into changing their legal regulations regarding 
nuclear energy. President Eisenhower asked Congress to change the atomic energy 
legislation and the amendment of the McMahon Act was passed in June 1958. 
From then on, the transfer of nuclear information was allowed to a country that 
had made a "substantial progress” in the development of atomic weapons.33 With­
out doubt, Britain was the only country that was meeting this criterion. On 3 July 
1958, an exceptional agreement for co-operation on the uses of atomic energy for 
mutual defense purposes (commonly known as the Mutual Defense Agreement) 
was signed between the United States and Great Britain. It allowed for extremely 
broad and close nuclear co-operation. As John Baylis remarks, “It provided for the 
unprecedented exchange of a wide range of vital nuclear secrets and established a 
framework for an Anglo-American nuclear partnership which remained in force 
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throughout the cold war period and which continues in the late 1990s.”33 4 The 
agreement became a cornerstone of Anglo-American nuclear collaboration, which 
has grown into the central component of the special relationship. Independence 
(the development of British nuclear technology) was used by Britain as a means 
leading to interdependence (the restoration of Anglo-American co-operation).3’ 
Although Britain’s quest for full nuclear collaboration and interchange with the 
United States was a source of friction and bitterness in the special relationship, the 
tactic appeared to be wholly successful.
33 J. Baylis, Exchanging Nuclear Secrets: Laying the Foundations of the Anglo-American
Nuclear Relationship, “Diplomatic History," vol. 25, issue 1, Winter 2001, pp. 33-61.
35 I. Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship. Britain 's Deterrent and Amer­
ica, 1957-1962, Clarendon Press, London 1994, p. 105.
36 J. Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence. British Nuclear Strategy 1945-1964, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford 1995, pp. 286-287; S. Menaul, Countdoum. Britain's Strategic Nuclear Forces, 
Robert Hale, London 1980, pp. 102-106; I. Clark, op.cit., pp. 157-189; K. Harrison, From Inde­
pendence to Dependence: Blue Streak, Skybolt, Nassau and Polaris, “RUSI Journal,” vol. 127, 
no. 4, December 1982, pp. 26-27.
It was a great achievement of the Macmillan government. Everything looked as 
though the close nuclear partnership had been restored and, hence, the special rela­
tionship crucially reinforced. Nonetheless, the next crisis, this time one of the most 




A British nuclear deterrent system was being initially developed in the period of 
1956-1960. Its realization was carried out by the Air Ministry. The resulting V-bom- 
bers, gradually fitted with nuclear weapons, were coming into service. Within the Air 
Force research and development (R&D) work was also conducted on ballistic mis­
siles. As a potential successor for the V-bombers, which in an age of advancing 
technological development were becoming less effective and more vulnerable, the 
IRBM (intermediate range ballistic missile) Blue Streak had been chosen and its de­
velopment commenced in 1955. The basic premise was to maintain an independent 
deterrent force and to obtain the capability of reaching Soviet territory. Yet, in Feb­
ruary I960, following the recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Com­
mittee made a decision to abandon the program. There were several reasons for this 
but strategic, technological and financial considerations were of decisive impor­
tance.36 First, the missiles placed in the underground silos would be highly suscepti­
ble to attack. The early warning system would give Britain only four to five minutes 
before a would-be Soviet attack. Therefore, Blue Streak could be used only as a first- 
strike weapon but this was not sufficient to make British deterrent credible enough. 
Second-strike capacity was required, as well as a more mobile system. Second, the 
development of the Soviet anti-ballistic missile capabilities questioned the missile's 
military value, making Blue Streak relatively ineffective. Third, given the above dis­
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advantages, the system was very expensive. According to the assessments it would 
cost, without warheads, around £500-600 million.
The Blue Streak project was the last British effort to secure an independent deliv­
ery system. With its cancellation Britain was to rely completely on American assis­
tance. Consequently, British strategic “independence” was to be undermined. The 
decision to abandon Blue Streak was followed by the recommendation to undertake 
negotiations with the US on the supply of American air-to-ground ballistic missile - 
Skybolt.
In tune with British wishes, during the Eisenhower-Macmillan meeting in Camp 
David, held between 26 and 29 March I960, the President provisionally agreed to 
sell Skybolt to Britain. The record was as follows: “In a desire to be of assistance in 
improving and extending the effective life of the V-bomber force, the US, subject 
only to US priorities, is prepared to provide Skybolt missiles - minus warheads - to 
the UK on a reimbursable basis in 1965 or thereafter. Since Skybolt is still in the 
early stages of development, this offer is necessarily dependent on the successful 
and timely completion of its development program.”17 Dunng the summit another 
agreement was also signed. Britain agreed to make its Scottish port, Holy Loch, 
available for American submarines carrying Polaris missiles.18 These two deals - 
Skybolt and Holy Loch - have commonly been considered as linked with each 
other. Although it was not a real tie-in transaction, there was undoubtedly some 
serious connection between the two agreements which spelled “interdependence.” 
The Camp David meeting and its outcomes constituted one step further in the proc­
ess of restoration of the special partnership.
17 Memorandum From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Macmillan, Camp David, 29 
March I960, Foreign Relations of the United States (PR US), GPO, Washington D.C. 1958-1960, 
Vol. VII/2, p. 863.
18 D. Murray, Kennedy, Macmillan and Nuclear Weapons, Macmillan, London 2000, pp. 
38-44.
19 PRO, CAB 129/101 C (60) 97, Memorandum of Understanding, 6 June I960.
40 G.M. Dillon, op.cit., p. 27.
The Memorandum of Understanding signed in June by the British minister of 
defense, Harold Watkinson, and his American counterpart, Thomas Gates regulated 
the details of the agreement.19 The US was to cover the entire R&D costs and then, 
when ready, sell Skybolt missiles - minus warheads - to Great Britain.
After giving up the development of ground-launched delivery systems, the British 
made all of their efforts to extend the operational capabilities of their strategic Air 
Force. Fitting the V-bombers with Skybolt was thought to be the solution to the 
stalemate - a way of maintaining a credible deterrent system until the early 1970s 
and thus, sustaining Britain’s deterrence posture.
American R&D on Skybolt, though, met serious difficulties and the chances of the 
production of a fully operational and effective missile was moving away. It had been 
originally foreseen that the rocket would obtain its operational status in October 
1964. Yet in 1962 it was estimated that this would be possible only in 1966. The 
costs were growing drastically. When the project had been initiated they were cal­
culated at approximately $354 million, while in 1962 the sum was already $493 mil­
lion.40 Apart from the financial problems technical difficulties also occurred - all five 
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tests failed. Thus, the whole program was in jeopardy, especially when confronted 
with the successful developments of two other systems: Minuteman (the interconti­
nental missile) and Polaris (the submarine rocket). Consequently, the US began to 
consider the possibility of canceling the Skybolt project.'*1
Although the British were fairly early aware of difficulties surrounding Skybolt 
and were kept up-to-date about its progress, they strongly believed that the project 
would be completed.41 2 Macmillan wrote in his memoirs: “There had since been 
some disquieting rumours of technical difficulties in relation to Skybolt; but Presi­
dent Eisenhower and subsequently President Kennedy had assured me that these 
would be overcome. As late as April 1962, the minister of defense, Peter Thorney- 
croft, had felt it possible to assure the House of Commons that he had no evidence 
of any unforeseen setback.”43 At the end of November 1962 the Americans officially 
informed the British about the problems that has arisen with Skybolt but still both 
sides were somewhat playing for time. When US defense secretary, Robert 
McNamara visited London in December, it seemed that the decision on the aban­
donment of Skybolt was already a fait accompli. McNamara, however, assured the 
British that the final decision would not be taken without prior mutual 
“consultations" which for the British, it seems, meant “compensation." Despite this 
promise, the explicit disclosure of American intentions “led to a veritable political 
eruption in London, a wave of anti-Americanism in the British public, and at the 
official level the greatest crisis between the two countries since the Suez affair.”44 
British reaction might be best described as a mixture of shock, indignation and an­
ger. Pandora’s box had been opened.
41 R.C. Williams, Skybolt and American Foreign Policy, “Military Affairs," vol. 30, no. 3, 
1966, pp. 153-160.
42 PRO, PREM 11/3716, The Importance of Skybolt to the RAF, Skybolt Development Prog­
ress-, PRO, PREM 11/3716, David Ormsby Gore from Washington to Foreign Office, November 
28, 1962; J. Baylis, Ambiguity..., pp. 312-316.
43 H. Macmillan, At the End of the Day, 1961-1963, Macmillan, London 1973, pp. 342-343
44 A.J. Pierre, Nuclear Politics. The British Experience ivith an Independent Strategic Force, 
1939-70, Oxford University Press, London 1972, p. 224.
44 Quoted in: R.C. Williams, op.cit., p. 157.
The American and British perspectives
In the United States the Skybolt problem was seen in technical and economic terms. 
Thus, the arguments for the cancellation of the missile were all about technical diffi­
culties and rapidly increasing costs. There was also strategic reasoning since Skybolt 
combined the disadvantages of bombers (vulnerable to attack while on the ground) 
and missiles (the limitations of accuracy and range). McNamara attempted to justify 
the decision referring to a more technically advanced system: “In view of Minute- 
man’s greater flexibility, reliability, accuracy, its much lower vulnerability and faster 
time to target, it clearly makes sense to meet our extra missile requirements by buy­
ing Minuteman rather than Skybolt.”45
Conversely, for Britain Skybolt was merely a political problem since the future of 
British deterrent, and hence defense and security policies, depended on the success 
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of the project. Therefore, the possession of the missile turned out to be crucial for 
maintaining British independent nuclear forces. Skybolt became the symbol of Brit­
ain’s standing in the nuclear club. On the one hand, Kennedy seemed not to be 
completely aware of diplomatic implications of Skybolt’s demise. On the other, 
Macmillan appeared to ignore American arguments regarding technical complica­
tions and cost-effectiveness calculations.
During the Cuban missile crisis the Skybolt problem, unsurprisingly, became ut­
terly unimportant for the US and was put aside. Such a trifling issue as the impact of 
the decision to abandon the project on British public opinion or on bilateral rela­
tions was hardly considered. There were much more important problems to be con­
cerned with - the danger of a nuclear war between the superpowers being the most 
worrying.
In the meantime, in Britain the atmosphere of anti-Americanism was becoming 
evident. The British were convinced of the American intention to throw them out of 
the “nuclear club.” US officials’ statements significantly strengthened this feeling of 
distrust facilitating the rise of conspiracy theories. In his speech of 16 June 1962 at 
the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, Robert McNamara said that “limited nuclear 
capabilities, operating independently, are dangerous, expensive, prone to obsoles­
cence and lacking credibility as a deterrent.”46 47Although afterwards the United States 
insisted that the statement was not aimed at Britain’s nuclear deterrent, at the time it 
was obvious that the secretary of defense had the UK in mind. Former secretary of 
state, Dean Acheson added fuel to the flames when on 5 December 1962 affirmed at 
West Point that “Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a new 
role."'’7 The British might have rightly suspected that their nuclear “independence” 
constituted a major obstacle for American strategic considerations.
46 Quoted in: K. Harrison, op.cit., p. 29.
47 Quoted in: A.J. Pierre, op.cit., p. 225.
The US had finally given up the strategy of massive retaliation and was gradually 
introducing the doctrine of flexible response. In short, nuclear defense - “the sword" 
- was to be conducted by the Americans, and Western Europe was to be protected 
by their nuclear umbrella. Meanwhile, the European NATO allies were expected to 
increase their expenditures on conventional forces in order to build up “the shield.” 
At the heart of the idea of the doctrine laid a gradual and elastic counteraction to 
Soviet threats. In the first instance the conventional shield would be employed. Only 
once it failed, the US would gradually make use of its nuclear forces. Logically, the 
development of independent European nuclear capabilities was not in tune with 
those American plans. Any further nuclear proliferation in Western Europe would 
work against the cohesion of Western nuclear capacities. For the US, its European 
allies would much better contribute to the defense of the Alliance by reinforcing 
their conventional forces while leaving nuclear deterrence exclusively to the United 
States.
Therefore, US politicians did not subscribe to the opinion expressed by Andre 
Beaufre that the West’s ability to deter Soviet attack had been strengthened by the 
existence of three separate centers of nuclear decision in the West (Washington, 
London and Paris). They strongly attempted to limit national proliferation through 
multilateralization. The idea was not to devolve nuclear decision-making to the allies 
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but to centralize it under American control. This was one of the basic assumptions of 
McNamara’s strategy. The secretary of defense argued that “we must avoid the frag­
mentation and compartmentalization of NATO’s nuclear power, which could be 
dangerous to us all.”4“ It was thought that US proposal for the Multilateral Nuclear 
Force (MLF) would satisfy European demands for a say in nuclear decision-making 
process and reduce their future nuclear aspirations. However, there was more sym­
bolism in this proposition than resultant changes in practice.
48 W.W. Kaufman, The McNamara Strategy, Harper & Row Publishers, New York-London 
1964, p. 123.
49 H. Brandon, Special Relationships. A Foreign Correspondent ’s Memoirs From Roosevelt to 
Reagan, Macmillan, London 1988-, p. 165.
50 PRO, PREM 11/4229, Record of a meeting held at Bali-Hai, the Bahamas, at 9.50 am. on 
Wednesday, December 19, 1962, December 19, 1962.
51 H. Macmillan, op.cit., p. 358.
The sequence of events from the Cuban crisis through the statements by 
McNamara and Acheson to the cancellation of Skybolt not only undermined British 
public trust in the US but also weakened the Macmillan government's position. The 
crisis, which serves as an astonishing example of miscommunication between close 
allies, grew to be a real “political dynamite” in the bilateral relations, and thereby the 
true test for the special relationship. By and large, it was a tangible evidence of the 
growing British dependence on the United States.
Solution — the Nassau conference
The Skybolt affair dominated the agenda of the Nassau meeting between Kennedy 
and Macmillan held on 18-21 December 1962. Macmillan in his opening and melo­
dramatic speech referred, among other things, to close relations between the two 
countries, to nuclear co-operation during the Second World War, emphasizing espe­
cially British contributions, and to the restoration of the special relationship after the 
Suez crisis. Henry Brandon described his talk in this way: “Macmillan opened the 
conference like a Mark Anthony giving the funeral oration (...).”'w Then, the Prime 
Minister moved on to the Skybolt problem, reminding President Eisenhower’s com­
mitment made in Camp David.48 950 Macmillan stated that the US had the “moral obliga­
tion” to supply Britain with the equivalent of Skybolt, which for him was Polaris. At 
first President Kennedy was strongly opposed. It would have been extremely diffi­
cult for the US to be bound by any bilateral agreement on the supply of ballistic 
missiles at a time when it was pushing the multinational approach within NATO and 
when the US was denying its allies any firm right of decision in nuclear matters. 
Kennedy proposed a solution - the continuation of the Skybolt project as a mutual 
enterprise with Britain sharing 50 per cent of R&D costs. The proposition was unac­
ceptable for the British since Skybolt was no longer a credible deterrent. Macmillan 
expressed this bluntly: “Although the proposed British marriage with Skybolt was 
not exactly a shotgun wedding, the virginity of the lady must now be regarded as 
doubtful. We were being asked to spend hundreds of millions of dollars upon a 
weapon on which the President’s own authorities were casting doubts, both publicly 
and privately."51 Skybolt was already a dead horse.
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Subsequently, the Americans came up with another option - the Hound Dog mis­
sile which, like Skybolt, could have been carried by the V-bombers.52 That was nei­
ther to be accepted by the British given that the missile could not in fact perform a 
strategic role. At this point, they were determined to obtain Polaris believing that 
they had the right to do so.
52 PRO, PREM 11/4229, Record of a meeting held at Bali-Hai, the Bahamas, at 10.30 a.m. 
on Thursday, December 20, 1962, December 20, 1962.
53 R.E. Neustadt, Report to RFK. The Skybolt Crisis in Perspective, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca-London 1999, p. 81.
541. Clark, op.cit., p. 395.
55 Quoted in: R.E. Neustadt, op.cit., p. 80.
56 PRO, PREM 11/4229, Statement on Nuclear Defence Systems, December 21, 1962.
57 Ibidem, par. 9.
Macmillan decided to use more dramatic arguments and play on friendship and 
fear, rightly assuming that this way he would make a strong impression on the 
President. He simply asked whether Kennedy wanted to be held responsible for the 
fall of his government, a great anti-American frustration in Britain and the decline of 
the just rebuilt special relationship. Without doubt, the President must have been 
moved. After his stirring speech the Prime Minister directly asked Kennedy what 
were his intentions. For both sides there could have been no doubt - Britain would 
be satisfied only with Polaris as a substitute for the unfortunate Skybolt.
It looked as if Kennedy understood the anger and determination of the British. 
Eventually, the President agreed to sell Polaris to Britain. It would be, however, a 
mistake to see this decision merely as the result of Macmillan’s pressure because just 
before Nassau, on 16 December, during Kennedy’s meeting with his chief advisers 
the agreement was reached to provide Britain with Polaris.53 There was a fear in the 
US that unless Britain was supplied with a substitute for Skybolt, it could have opted 
for co-operation with France and “offer de Gaulle nuclear aid in exchange for his 
OK on England joining the Market.”54 This possibility of the Anglo-French tie-in 
transaction, taken quite seriously in Washington, was one of the reasons why the US 
agreed to sell Polaris to Britain. What is more, the public attitude in the United States 
was rather sympathetic to Britain as reflected in the “Washington Post” comment on 
15 December: “(...) the Government of the United States has handled its relations 
with Great Britain with little consideration for British feelings, and not much evi­
dence of real concern about the British position.”55
Although the Americans did not want to risk the special relationship, at the same 
time they could not make their MLF proposition vulnerable to the criticism based on 
exceptional treatment for the British. Thus, the solution that had been worked out 
was to tie British Polaris force with the NATO’s multilateralization. The way out was 
to make the Polaris offer, in contrast to Skybolt, conditional - to link it with the 
projected MLF.
As the result of the Bahamas Conference, on 21 December 1962, the Statement 
on Nuclear Defense Systems was published.56 The United States agreed to provide 
Britain with Polaris missiles, less warheads. The UK was to produce the warheads 
and submarines on its own. British nuclear forces that were established in this way 
were to become the part of NATO multilateral nuclear forces and serve “for the pur­
poses of international defense of the Western Alliance.”57 Nevertheless, Britain re­
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served the right of independent use of the weapons “where her Majesty’s Govern­
ment may decide that supreme national interests are at stake.” This escape-clause 
was thought to assure the independence of British nuclear forces. That, however, 
was rather ambiguous and as Andrew Pierre rightly points out: “(...) could one 
imagine Britain considering the use of nuclear weapons in circumstances other than 
those involving the supreme national interest?”58 Nonetheless, the escape-clause 
preserved the symbolism of independence. The agreement was thought to be 
“a major milestone in the long march to a truly interdependent Atlantic alliance.”59 
Thus, British nuclear forces were assigned the role of forming a key component of 
the MLF. In fact, they were thought to become, along with American submarines, a 
foundation for the joint controlled and commanded NATO nuclear forces.
58 A.J. Pierre, op.cit., p. 237.
59 W.W. Kaufman, op.cit., p. 126.
60 J. Baylis, The Anglo-American..., p. 377.
The Nassau Conference and Agreement were, unquestionably, Macmillan’s dip­
lomatic successes. He achieved what he was striving for - the most sophisticated 
means of delivery - on extremely favorable conditions. The British were not to par­
ticipate in the costs of R&D but only pay for ready missiles. Polaris was to secure the 
UK’s operational capabilities up to the early 1990s. Nassau became the peak of 
Macmillan’s policy of interdependence and the crowning achievement of merging 
two cardinal points of reference of his foreign policy: the “special relationship” and 
the “independent deterrent.” On the other hand, however, Great Britain had become 
strongly dependent on American delivery systems which made the thesis of its 
“independent nuclear deterrent” highly debatable. As far as the American interests 
are concerned, the US acquired a strong influence over Britain’s nuclear capabilities 
and future aspirations.
THE SKYBOLT CRISIS AND THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
Paradoxical consequences
The crisis under examination had far-reaching consequences, which were not lim­
ited only to the area of nuclear co-operation. First and foremost, it was the most 
severe crisis in the special relationship, newly restored after the Suez debacle, and 
posed a real danger of disintegration of the partnership. Paradoxically enough, after 
the period of serious tension, the special relationship was strengthened and ce­
mented. During the crisis the continuation of the entire partnership was at stake but 
after the problems had been overcome, the special relationship seemed to flourish 
again. The situation was very similar to that surrounding the Suez affair. The tradi­
tional alliance theory explains neither the Suez nor the Skybolt crises since it sug­
gests that “when there are contradictory interests, alliances must give way.”60 In 
contrast, both Suez and Skybolt led to the reinforcement of the alliance.
Three types of consequences of the crisis can be distinguished. First, as has al­
ready been mentioned, closer relations were established in nuclear affairs. Second, 
the priorities of British nuclear strategy and policy were radically changed as a result 
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of the decisions made in the Bahamas. Third, the problem of independence and 
interdependence not only of British deterrent but also, more generally, of British 
foreign policy had arisen as a serious issue.
Changes in British nuclear policy
From the early beginnings, that is since the 1940s, the British nuclear program was 
developed under the RAF (Royal Air Force). Until the late 1960s the role of nuclear 
deterrent was conducted by Bomber Command. Although Britain undertook the 
development of its own projects of ballistic missiles (e.g. Blue Streak), which were to 
replace the V-bombers in the mid-1960s, it was given up because of technical and 
financial difficulties. The British, therefore, went back to the formula of deterrent 
carried out by the RAF. Nevertheless, in order to maintain the operational capabili­
ties, the decision was made to purchase the American air-launched Skybolt missile. 
When the US abandoned the project, Britain found itself in a dilemma. A modern 
delivery system was badly needed in order to extend the operational capabilities of 
British nuclear weapons up to the early 1990s. As the result of the Nassau Confer­
ence, the US agreed to provide Britain with the most modern delivery system - the 
submarine-launched ballistic missile Polaris. One of the effects of the 1962 events 
was that the priorities of British nuclear policy were drastically changed. The whole 
responsibility for the future deterrent was taken over by the Royal Navy. Contempo­
rary British nuclear policy took shape as the result of decisions taken in Nassau. 
Therefore, the Bahamas Conference can be regarded as a real turning point in the 
history of the development of British nuclear program and also in the special rela­
tionship.
The year 1962, then, can and should be viewed as one of the breakthroughs in 
the history of British nuclear program and policy. It has its deserved place among 
such events as: 1940/41 - the Frisch-Peierls Memorandum and the MAUD Report; 
1947 and 1952 - the decision to build an atomic bomb and its first explosion; 1954 
and 1957 - the decision to build a hydrogen bomb and its first successful test; and 
1958 - the Anglo-American Mutual Defense Agreement.
INDEPENDENCE-INTERDEPENDENCE-DEPENDENCE.
NUCLEAR CO-OPERATION AND THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
The development of military nuclear technology in Britain can only be compre­
hended in the context of the evolution of Anglo-American relations. The crucial role 
in the description of this process is played by the concept of independence­
interdependence-dependence.
Various types of relations between two countries can be distinguished. One ap­
proach is to present them as a continuum, one end of which is occupied by self- 
reliance/independence and the other - by dependence.61 Self-reliance is the ability 
to fulfill a state’s needs by employing its own resources. Dependence, on the other 
hand, can be identified as meeting these needs only by using the resources under 
61 J. Simpson, op.cit., pp. 14—15.
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control of other state. Following John Simpson we can single out two types of de­
pendency: absolute and relative. The first type occurs when the fulfillment of the 
needs is impossible once the relations between two states are broken off. We deal 
with the second one when the needs can be met in some other way, not only by the 
assistance of a particular state. As far as the relations between the weaker state and 
the stronger one are concerned, we are usually dealing with the asymmetrical rela­
tionship of dependency, with a weaker state in a position of absolute or relative 
dependence.
Anglo-American nuclear co-operation has evolved from a phase of integration 
(1943-1946), through a period of full independence (1946-1957), followed by inter­
dependence (1958-1962/63) until the stage of dependency which has lasted up to 
the present day. Close relations with the United States have helped Britain to save 
time and money but it has to be said that even without American assistance, the UK 
would probably have been able to produce and maintain its nuclear deterrent. If the 
Nassau Accord had not been reached, it would have been possible for Britain to opt 
for an entente nucleaire with France. Therefore, Anglo-American relations cannot be 
classified as an absolute dependency, but relative - it could have been overcome by 
the employment of its own, adequately high, expenditures and/or by the establish­
ing of closer co-operation with another country (France being the most probable 
option). Nevertheless, there is no question that as early as the abandonment of Blue 
Streak, and symbolically as early as Nassau, Britain has been dependent on the 
American means of delivery. The possession of nuclear capabilities (the ability to 
produce warheads) does not suffice. What matters is the capacity to manufacture the 
means of delivery. Thus, the decision to abandon an independent British develop­
ment of the delivery vehicle was made after it was recognized “that the pursuit of 
full independence was largely illusory.”62
62 J. Baylis, Ambiguity..., p. 288.
63 Ibidem.
M PRO, DEFE 6/81, JP (62) 134 Final, December 3, 1962.
To sum up, Britain is not absolutely dependent on the United States. It could 
have independently manufactured and maintained a nuclear weapon system. In the 
situation of a threat to national security it could, and still can, independently use 
nuclear weapons (the Nassau Agreement’s “opt-out clause"). The British nuclear 
deterrent, as it took shape in the aftermath of Nassau, can be compared to driving a 
car. One has to refuel and from time to time have it serviced but this does not stop 
the car from being one’s property, nor from driving it in the direction one chooses.
British understanding of the confusing term of “independence” changed after the 
Suez crisis and a “much more modest vision of independence” was adopted.63 In the 
early 1960s serious attempts were undertaken in order to work out its definition. The 
aim was also to establish a less ambiguous concept on which national nuclear policy 
could be based. In December 1962 the Joint Planning Staff prepared its Report. Two 
conditions of “independence" in the field of nuclear weapons were recognized. The 
first was that “the final authority for the dispatch of the strategic nuclear force must 
be retained by the UK government (...).” The second read that “every element of the 
weapon system should be owned, manned, maintained, supported and controlled 
by Britain”.64 The former, being in accord with the Nassau Agreement’s escape- 
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clause, has been fulfilled. Yet some serious doubts have remained in reference to 
the latter. Although Britain was to produce both warheads and submarines for the 
Polaris missiles on its own, it used American assistance widely. British warheads 
were constructed on the model of American W76 ones and were tested in the 
American Nevada trials site. What is more, the construction of British Polaris Resolu­
tion-class submarines was based on American Ohio-class submarine and a number 
of components were of American production. The fuel for the submarines’ reactors 
as well as for warheads came from the US. By and large, the whole maintenance of 
the Polaris system was highly dependent on the American assistance. In the case of 
Polaris’ successor - Trident - also provided by the United States (as the result of 
agreements reached in 1980-1982), the dependence has been even greater, espe­
cially in the spheres of communication and navigation.65 This evidence calls into 
question the fulfillment of the second condition of “independence” as singled out in 
the 19б2 Report.
65 See: C. Mclnnes, Trident. The Only Option?, Brassey’s Defence Publishers, London 1986.
66 PRO, PREM 11/4229, Prime Minister’s Talks with President Kennedy and Mr Diefenbaker 
in the Bahamas, December 18-22, 1962.
67 PRO, PREM 11/4052, Macmillan to Kennedy, December 24, 1962.
68 W. Wallace, What price independence? Sovereignty and interdependence in British poli­
tics, “International Affairs," vol. 62, no. 3, 1986, p. 370.
Along with growing dependence on the United States, British understanding of 
“independence” was being narrowed. Hence, unsurprisingly, it kept British politi­
cians awake at night. Macmillan was clearly aware of the dilemma and, during one 
of the Nassau meetings, expressed it by saying that the British were “between two 
worlds, the world of independence which was now ceasing to exist and the world 
of interdependence which we had not yet reached, though we were moving towards 
it. The nearer we got to it, the more surrender of sovereignty there would have to be 
in practice, but until our design for interdependence was completed, we must be 
able in the last resort to control our own forces.”66 It seems, therefore, that the sec­
ond condition was being gradually weakened so the final criterion for an "inde­
pendent" nuclear force became the ability of using them autonomously. Since 1962 
Britain has been moving towards “the world of interdependence.” It was characteris­
tic for both nuclear co-operation and the special relationship in general. When the 
relationship was becoming more “special” and the co-operation was deepening, it 
was more and more difficult for Britain to sustain the “nice balance" between two 
contradicting notions. This should be better understood when we quote what Mac­
millan wrote to Kennedy about Nassau - it was “a historic example of the nice bal­
ance between interdependence and independence which is necessary if Sovereign 
states are to work in partnership.”67 It seems that in order to preserve this balance, 
the British more often appealed to the mythologization of an “independent” deter­
rent and to symbolization of the special relationship. By and large, “dependence on 
the United States was justified by the benefits this “special” relationship brought to 
Britain (.,.).”68
Apart from the connections in the area of nuclear technology, the close co­
ordination of strategic planning meant that British plans were to be subordinated to 
American ones (among other things in the hierarchy of nuclear targeting). The Brit­
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ish also relied heavily on the American early warning systems. With the increasing 
development of nuclear technology, British dependency was systematically growing, 
passing subsequently through the following phases: Skybolt - Polaris - Trident.69
69 L. Freedman, M. Navias, N. Wheeler, Independence in Concert: The British Rationale for 
Possessing Strategic Nuclear Weapons, Occasional Paper 5, Centre for International Security 
Studies at Maryland School of Public Affairs, Maryland 1989.
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1961-1963, vol. XIII, pp. 743-744.
71 J. Newhouse, De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons, Andre Deutsch, London 1970, pp. 232- 
-237; R.E. Neustadt, Report to RFK, p. 106.
72 PRO, PREM 11/4230, Visit of the Prime Minister to Chateau de Rambouillet, December 
15-16, 1962; Record of conversation at Rambouillet at 3 45 p.m. on Saturday, December 15, 
1962; Record of conversation at Rambouillet at 12 noon on Sunday, December 16, 1962; “(. . .) 
the General had told me that Britain would not wish to join Europe and that the country and 
the Commonwealth were not ready.” H. Macmillan, op.cit., p. 351; J. Newhouse, op.cit., 
p. 209.
73 R.E. Neustadt, op.cit., p. 1.
Implementing the policy of interdependence meant the restoration of old, and 
the establishment of new, links with the US. One can subscribe to the following 
generalization: the deeper the interdependence, the closer the special relationship 
grew to be. Without doubt close partnership with the United States did not help 
Britain in its application to the Common Market. It will be recalled that in Nassau 
Kennedy and Macmillan also decided to offer Polaris to France.70 The basic idea was 
not to alienate de Gaulle, to prove American good intentions and to tie France with 
the planned MLF. During his press conference on 14 January 1963, President Charles 
de Gaulle announced his decision - the double “non.” He rejected Kennedy’s 
proposition regarding Polaris and blocked Britain joining the Common Market.71 The 
Nassau Agreement convinced de Gaulle that every time Britain had to choose be­
tween the US and Europe it would choose the former. However, the assumption that 
it was the Nassau Agreement that caused the French veto simply does not hold true. 
There was no such a direct connection. Immediately before the meeting with Ken­
nedy in the Bahamas, Macmillan visited de Gaulle. During the talks in Rambouillet 
the French President unambiguously gave Macmillan to understand that he intended 
to veto British application.72 73Thus, Nassau served for de Gaulle only as an excellent 
pretext. In this light, the Nassau Agreement can be said to be "the symbol of Brit­
ain’s insufficient Europeannes and the transatlantic entanglement of its deterrent.”7’
As for the US, the special relationship appeared to be a serious obstacle for im­
plementing the concept of “nuclear sharing" within NATO and also partly of doc­
trine of the limited nuclear war. For Britain it became a big barrier in its way to­
wards closer relations with Europe.
While the Skybolt crisis can be viewed as an example of the periodic friction in 
the special relationship, though a very serious one at that, the Nassau and Polaris 
Agreements may be seen as further steps in the process of restoration of the partner­
ship. In the late 1950s and early 1960s growing inequality in the alliance was evi­
dent. It was transforming into a highly dependent relationship. The maintenance of a 
British “independent” nuclear force was ultimately dependent upon US security 
guarantees and good will. The notion of British dependency developed into an in­
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herent feature of the special partnership. It is the most evident where nuclear affairs 
are concerned. British dependence reflected Britain’s weakness on the one side and 
the US superpower status on the other. Along with the developments in nuclear 
technology and changes in strategy, British dependence on the US was deepening. 
This shows the progressive character of this dependency, and the Skybolt affair con­
stituted an important step in the process of its extension. By and large, the Anglo- 
American special partnership and its chief component - nuclear collaboration, in 
particular, appear to support the judgment that “independence and interdependence 
need not to be mutually exclusive.”7,1
* * *
Two, at first glimpse different, factors - technology and diplomacy - constituted 
the basic components of the special relationship. They were closely interrelated as 
the Skybolt affair shows. The disagreement over technology grew to be a severe 
crisis in Anglo-American diplomatic relations. This friction was effectively minimized 
and the conflict successfully resolved through the use of diplomatic means. How­
ever, while the crisis over Skybolt highlighted British dependence on the United 
States, the Nassau Agreement merely confirmed it. Although Britain enjoyed excep­
tional access to American nuclear secrets and weapons, it was to become the only 
nuclear power devoid of a delivery system of its own.
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